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Abstract 
 
We analyze the effects of a domestic standard that reduces an externality associated with the 
consumption of the good targeted by the standard, using a model in which foreign and domestic 
producers compete in the domestic good market. Producers can reduce expected damage 
associated with the externality by incurring a cost that varies by source of origin. Despite 
potential protectionism, the standard is useful in correcting the consumption externality in the 
domestic country. Protectionism occurs when the welfare-maximizing domestic standard is 
higher than the international standard maximizing welfare inclusive of foreign profits. The 
standard is actually anti-protectionist when foreign producers are much more efficient at 
addressing the externality than are domestic producers. Possible exclusion of domestic or foreign 
producers arises with large standards, which may alter the classification of a standard as 
protectionist or non-protectionist. The paper provides important implications for the estimation 
and use of tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers.  
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1. Introduction 
We analyze the effects of an optimum domestic standard that reduces an externality associated 
with the consumption of the good targeted by the standard, using a model in which foreign and 
domestic producers compete in the domestic good market. Producers can reduce the expected 
damage associated with the consumption externality by incurring a cost that varies by source of 
origin. Despite potential protectionism, the standard is useful in correcting the consumption 
externality in the domestic country. Protectionism occurs when the welfare-maximizing domestic 
standard is higher than the international standard maximizing welfare inclusive of foreign profits. 
Anti-protectionism is the converse case. The domestic standard can be anti-protectionist when 
foreign producers are much more efficient at addressing the externality than are domestic 
producers.  
Guaranteeing products’ safety or environmental friendliness to consumers is challenging 
for many industries offering products such as aircrafts, cars, food, chemical products, or oil 
transportation. Limited care and control in design or manufacture of goods can result in failures 
of these goods with significant damages (e.g., from oil spills, food poisoning, and aircraft 
failures). This issue is extremely sensitive in the context of globalization where producers are 
located in many countries and sometimes impose very different regulations. The need for 
regulation may be very important when consumers (or environmentalists) cannot be certain of a 
product’s origin, which is the case when products from a variety of processors and countries are 
sold at the retail level with no brand designation (Beghin and Bureau, 2001). 
The implementation of the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 
particular, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreements, has provided significant momentum towards the use of international standards. 
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Increased notification requirements for both TBT and SPS regulations and the desire to 
avoid WTO dispute settlement procedures are making countries more thoughtful about the 
international impacts of their regulations aimed at protecting human, animal, and plant health. A 
number of disputes involving several OECD  countries have already been brought before 
the WTO since the dispute settlement procedure was established in 1995 (Dee and Ferrantino, 
2005).  
Government intervention is often required to protect consumers and the environment by 
guaranteeing that products internalize safety and environmental concerns. However, 
governments may use regulations as potential nontariff barriers (NTB) or even as a way to drive 
out foreign producers, particularly producers coming from some developing countries (Baldwin, 
1970). This is the case, for instance, with many food products unable to enter the European 
Union unless they obtain EU certification. This problem is sensitive when farmers from 
developing countries cannot meet some standard requirements that farmers in developed 
countries can meet. The main reasons are limited access to capital (refrigerators for the example 
of food safety; pesticide management tools for the example of the environment) a certification 
process, or qualified labor (Henson and Wilson, 2005). Even if a standard is welfare enhancing, 
it may restrict trade because of producers’ heterogeneity in terms of meeting these 
safety/environmental costs.  
We analyze the impact of producers’ heterogeneity on the standard selected by a 
domestic policy maker to address the safety or environmental externality. We investigate the 
potential protectionist impact of the standard. We focus on the choice of products’ or 
environments’ safety standard influencing both domestic and foreign producers selling in the 
domestic market. In a partial equilibrium model, competitive producers can increase the 
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probability of reducing the expected damage associated with the externality by incurring a cost 
that differs according to their foreign/domestic origin. The standard consists of determining a 
minimum level of reduction in the expected damage (e.g., a residue level or a tolerance level) 
with which all sellers should comply in offering their products.  
The domestic standard is selected by a policy maker seeking to maximize welfare defined 
by the sum of the producers’ profits and consumers’ surplus. The domestic standard may also 
influence producers’ exit because of relatively large costs of meeting the targeted safety 
improvement. As in Fisher and Serra (2000), this domestic standard is compared to the 
international standard that a social planner would have implemented if it had been designed for 
domestic purposes (i.e., all firms are domestic firms or all agents belong to a single economy). 
The latter definition is considered as non-protectionist (Fisher and Serra, 2000) since it could be 
compared to standards defined at the international level, such as the FAO/WHO Codex 
Alimentarius or WHO medical standards. 
We show that the domestic standard relative to an international standard is not always 
protectionist and can be anti-protectionist, implicitly subsidizing imports. In particular, a 
situation with much more efficient foreign producers compared to domestic producers leads to a 
lower domestic standard compared to the international one that would be chosen by a regulator, 
taking into account foreign producers in the welfare optimization. In addition, a situation with 
very inefficient foreign producers leads to the exclusion of the latter under both domestic and 
international standards.  
However, when the safety cost of foreign producers is either near or higher than the 
safety cost of domestic producers, the domestic standard is protectionist. What we mean by near 
is explained more precisely later in the modeling section. Moreover, when domestic producers 
 4
are very inefficient and the damage is relatively large, domestic producers may be driven out of 
the market (despite the absence of sunk cost in our model). The regulator imposes a domestic 
standard that is larger than the international one, since foreign producers incur a large part of the 
safety cost (that is passed onto consumers). In this case, protectionism emerges without a motive, 
as domestic producers exit the market, and the domestic standard obviously fails to protect 
domestic producers. 
The paper also derives new and important implications on the estimation and use of tariff 
equivalents for nontariff measures. The tariff equivalent is the price effect equivalent to the 
impact of the nontariff policy, in our case, a standard. We show that the computation of tariff 
equivalents is more complex than generally assumed (Deardorff and Stern, 1998), in particular 
when domestic or foreign producers can be driven out of the market. In other words, producers’ 
exclusion leads to discontinuities in tariff equivalent and even a shift in the sign of this tariff 
equivalent when less-efficient domestic producers leave the market. Finally, protectionist 
implications often derived in simple tariff-equivalent measures abstracting from the international 
standard could be seriously misleading.  
Our paper contributes to the TBT literature. Most of this literature has been empirical 
(see Deardorff and Stern, 1998, and Yue, Beghin, and Jensen, 2006) with very few analytical 
contributions, with the notable exception of Fisher and Serra, 2000. Our paper departs from the 
literature on standards in international trade, which has overlooked the important consequences 
of heterogeneity in safety cost. In particular, our results differ from and qualify Fisher and 
Serra’s (2000) main conclusion that, in the presence of a consumption externality, the standard 
chosen by the social planner is always protectionist. Conversely, we show that this previous 
result is less general than originally thought, because of potentially large safety cost 
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heterogeneity between domestic and foreign producers. In the latter case, the domestic standard 
is not systematically protectionist and can be anti-protectionist. Note that our results do not 
depend on any impact of quality on demand since the externality does not lead to any demand 
shifts, which crucially differs from the studies of Das and Donnenfeld (1987 and 1989); 
Chambers and Weiss (1992); Boom (1995); Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (1998); Tian (2003); 
and Sturm (2006). Nevertheless, our results are robust to relaxing the latter assumption and 
allowing for this interaction. The interaction induces a multiplicity of cases but does not 
invalidate the essential point that an optimum domestic standard may not be protectionist. 
Further, our results do not depend on the incentive to be more competitive by lowering 
environmental standards to reduce products costs and become more competitive in foreign 
markets, as in Barrett (1994), since we do not consider any foreign market. The selection of a 
domestic standard that is lower than the international one comes only from considerations about 
safety cost heterogeneity, without any strategic views for capturing potential market share on 
foreign markets. 
In the next section, we introduce the stylized model. Then we explain the market 
equilibrium and regulatory choice. Finally, we present some extensions and conclusions. 
 
2. Model 
We use a sparse and stylized framework in which trade occurs in a single period with domestic 
producers and foreign producers in a competitive market for good x. Extensions are discussed 
later. The ability to offer reliable products is determined by a combination of producers’ effort 
and randomness. Reliability may concern products’ safety or environmental cleanliness. The 
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producers’ ability to reduce risks depends on their effort and input decisions (new technologies 
or improvements in labor training) but remains to some degree imperfect. 
For simplicity, we let a producer’s effort be equivalent to the probability of a safe product 
emerging (making the probability a function of the effort just adds unnecessary complications for 
our purpose). With a probability0 1λ≤ ≤ , a producer only offers safe products and with a 
probability (1 )λ− , a producer only offers unsafe products. The level of care 0 1λ≤ ≤  comes 
about through a variable cost 2cλ  for a domestic producer and through a variable cost 2cγ λ  for a 
foreign producer with 0γ > . This parameter γ  captures natural, technological, organizational, or 
institutional advantage with 1γ <  for a foreign producer (respectively disadvantaged with 1γ > ). 
There is also a variable cost not depending on the safety effort, 2 / 2x , whatever the origin, where 
x  is the producer’s output. We assume that producers are price takers. For each county, there are 
a large number of producers, each of them with zero mass individually, but with aggregate mass 
normalized to one for simplicity. The total costs for domestic and foreign outputs dx  and fx  are, 
respectively, 2 2 / 2d dc x xλ +  and 2 2 / 2f fc x xγ λ + . 
For simplicity, a linear demand ( )x p a p= −  in the domestic country is considered, 
where a is a positive parameter indicating the maximum market size, and p is the price. All 
foreign production is exported to the domestic market. The expected external damage associated 
with the consumption of x is [ (1 ) (1 )]d d f fx x kλ λ− − + − , where dx  and fx  are domestic and 
foreign components of domestic consumption and 1 dλ−  and 1 fλ−  are the domestic and foreign 
probability of having unsafe products. Parameter k is a measure of the per-unit external damage. 
This damage does not influence the consumers’ choices, since we assume that damage and 
market decision are separable. This potential injury may correspond to an environmental damage 
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(see Freeman, 2003, p. 122) or to a safety damage directly linked to a product affecting unaware 
consumers at the time of the purchase (see Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983). The expected external 
damage is taken into account in the welfare by the regulator.  
The regulator may select a mandatory standard. This “reliable product” standard 
corresponds to a minimum level of effort λ  imposed on all producers offering products on the 
domestic market. The mandatory standard is selected by a domestic regulator searching to 
maximize domestic welfare defined by the sum of the domestic producers’ profits, the domestic 
consumers’ surplus, and the expected external damage.  
To determine the existence or the absence of protectionism, this domestic standard is 
compared with the international standard, chosen to maximize international welfare, namely, the 
domestic welfare plus the foreign producers’ profits. A higher domestic standard than an 
international standard is interpreted as protectionism. This definition corresponds to the Fisher 
and Serra’s (2000, p. 389) stipulation of a non-protectionist standard equal to the standard the 
social planner would use if all producers were domestic. 
We now turn to the description of the market equilibrium in the absence/presence of a 
standard. 
 
3. Market effects of a standard 
We first describe producers’ choices. As the damages are external to the demand and profit, 
producers have no incentive to choose any effort for reducing this damage in the absence of 
regulation. Because the effort selected by producers is zero without regulation, this means that a 
standard is the only way to impose a positive effort ( 0λ > ) to reduce the risk of this external 
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damage. We now turn to profits and welfare determination for a level of effort λ  imposed by the 
regulator. 
Based on the assumption in the previous section, the respective profits for domestic and 
foreign producers are  
2 2
2 2
/ 2
/ 2
d d d d
f f f f
px c x x
px c x x
λ
γ λ
⎧Π = − −⎪⎨Π = − +⎪⎩
.        (1) 
From the maximization of the profit dΠ , the supply curve for domestic producer is 
2
dx p cλ= − . From the maximization of the profit fΠ , the supply curve for foreign producer is 
2
fx p cγ λ= − . With demand ( )x p a p= − , the market clearing process is given by 
( ) d fx p x x= +  and leads to an equilibrium price 
2 2( ) ( ) / 3p a c cλ λ γ λ= + + .         (2) 
The substitution of ( )p λ  in quantities dx  and fx  leads to the equilibrium quantities 
2 2( ) ( 2 ) / 3dx a c cλ λ γ λ= − +  and 2 2( ) ( 2 ) / 3fx a c cλ λ γ λ= + − . The selected safety standard is 
compatible with positive offered quantities if ( ) 0dx λ >  and ( ) 0fx λ > . This is the case if the 
standard λ  is lower than ? ?, ,1d fMin λ λ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  with  
?
?
(2 )
,
(2 1)
d
f
a
c
a
c
λ γ
λ γ
⎧ =⎪ −⎪⎨⎪ =⎪ −⎩
         (3) 
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corresponding to ?( ) 0ddx λ =  and ?( ) 0ffx λ = . If (2 )a c γ> − , then ? 1dλ > , which means that the 
domestic producer will always offer products for 0 1λ≤ ≤ . Similarly, if (2 1)a c γ> − , then 
? 1fλ > , which means that the foreign producer will always offer products for 0 1λ≤ ≤ . 
For ? ?, ,1d fMinλ λ λ⎡ ⎤≤ ⎣ ⎦ , domestic and foreign producers offer ( )dx λ  and ( )fx λ  
respectively, leading to the equilibrium profits 
2 2 2
2 2 2
( 2 )( )
18
( 2 )( )
18
d
f
a c c
a c c
λ γ λλ
λ γ λλ
⎧ − +Π =⎪⎪⎨ + −⎪Π =⎪⎩
.       (4) 
At the equilibrium, the consumers’ surplus is 2 2 2( ) (2 ) /18dCS a c cλ λ γ λ= − − . By using 
the expected external damage [ (1 ) (1 )]d d f fx x kλ λ− − + −  of section 2, the overall damage 
coming from the product is equal to 2 2( ) (1 )(2 ) / 3K a c c kλ λ λ γ λ= − − − − . The domestic 
welfare, defined as the sum of producers’ profit, consumers’ surplus, and the external expected 
damage is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )d d dW CS Kλ λ λ λ= Π + + .       (5) 
The international welfare is defined as the sum of foreign producers’ profit and domestic 
welfare, namely, 
( ) ( ) ( )i d fW Wλ λ λ= + Π         (6) 
Alternatively, if the standard λ  chosen by the policy maker is greater than 
? ?, ,1d fMin λ λ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  as defined by (3), then less-efficient producers will exit the market. In this case, 
only the most efficient producers offer products involving two sub-cases.  
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In the first sub-case, if the standard is such that ? dλ λ≥  with ? 1dλ < , domestic producers 
exit the market. From the maximization of profit fΠ , given by (1), the supply curve for foreign 
producers is 2fx p cγ λ= − . The market clearing process, given by ( ) fx p x= , leads to an 
equilibrium price 
2( ) ( ) / 2p a cλ γ λ= + ,         (7) 
where the upper bar indicates the value of endogenous variables under this first alternative case 
?
dλ λ≥  with ? 1dλ < . The substitution of ( )p λ  and fx  in the profit function leads to the 
equilibrium profits, 2 2( ) ( ) /8f a cλ γ λΠ = − . At the equilibrium, the consumers’ surplus is 
2 2( ) ( ) /8dCS a cλ γ λ= − . The expected external damage associated with the consumption is 
equal to 2( ) (1 )( ) / 2K a c kλ λ γ λ= − − − . The domestic welfare, defined as the sum of consumers’ 
surplus and external expected damage is  
( ) ( ) ( )d dW CS Kλ λ λ= + .        (8) 
The international welfare is defined as the sum of foreign producers’ profit and domestic 
welfare, namely, 
( ) ( ) ( )fi dW Wλ λ λ= + Π .        (9) 
In the second sub-case, the standard is such that ? fλ λ>  with ? 1fλ < , the foreign 
producers exit the market. The most efficient producers are the domestic producers. From the 
maximization of the profit dΠ , given by (1), the supply curve for foreign producers is 
2
dx p cλ= − . With a demand ( )x p a p= − , the market clearing process, given by ( ) dx p x= , 
leads to an equilibrium price 
? 2( ) ( ) / 2p a cλ λ= +          (10) 
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where the upper tilde indicates the value of endogenous variables under this second alternative 
sub-case ?s fλ λ>  with ? 1fλ < . The substitution of ?( )p λ  and dx  in the profit function leads to 
equilibrium profit ? 2 2( ) ( ) /8d a cλ λΠ = −  for domestic producers. At the equilibrium, the 
consumers’ surplus is ? 2 2( ) ( ) /8dCS a cλ λ= − . The expected external damage associated with the 
consumption is equal to ? 2( ) (1 )( ) / 2K a c kλ λ λ= − − − . The domestic welfare (equal to the 
international welfare), defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus and external expected damage is  
? ? ? ?( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dd dW CS Kλ λ λ λ= Π + + .       (11) 
The regulator maximizes the welfare by considering a possible producers’ exit. To 
simplify the presentation, we successively consider the case in which producers’ exclusion is 
impossible and then the case in which producers can be excluded. Exclusion is impossible if the 
market is “big enough,” that is, [ (2 ), (2 1)]a Min c cγ γ≥ − −  corresponding to ? ?, 1d fMin λ λ⎡ ⎤ ≥⎣ ⎦ . 
Producers’ exclusion is possible for some values of ? ?, 1d fMin λ λ λ⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤⎣ ⎦  if 
[ (2 ), (2 1)]a Min c cγ γ< − −  corresponding to ? ?, 1d fMin λ λ⎡ ⎤ <⎣ ⎦ . This allows us to derive results 
specific to each case. 
 
4. The optimum standard in the absence of exclusion 
From section 3, exclusion of producers because of a high standard is impossible for any value of 
0 1λ≤ ≤ , if [ (2 ), (2 1)]a Min c cγ γ≥ − − . In other words, equilibrium price defined by (2) is 
sufficient for covering any level of effort. As producers’ exclusion is impossible, the standard 
choices are to consider either the maximization of the domestic welfare defined by (5) for the 
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domestic standard, or the maximization of the international welfare defined by (6) for the 
international standard. This leads us to compare the levels maximizing (5) and (6). 
The first derivatives of (5) and (6) are respectively equal to  
[ ]
[ ]
2 2 2
2 2 2
6 2(4 ) 10 ( ) (6 9 ) ( )4( )
9
2 ( ) 4 ( ) (2 3 ) ( )4( )
3
d
i
a k c c c c c k c c cdW
d
a k c c c c c k c c cdW
d
γ λ λ λ γ λ γ γ λλ
λ
γ λ λ λ γ λ γ γ λλ
λ
⎧ ⎡ ⎤− + + + + − + −⎣ ⎦=⎪⎪⎨ ⎡ ⎤− + + + + − + −⎪ ⎣ ⎦=⎪⎩
 , (12) 
with 2 2( ) / 0dd W dλ λ <  and 2 2( ) / 0id W dλ λ < . The difference between the two expressions of 
(12) evaluated at any arbitrary level of λ  allows us to get information about the optimal standard 
under both configurations. The difference between the first derivatives is given by 
22 (1 2 ) (1 2 )( ) ( )
9
i d
c a cdW dW
d d
λ γ γ λλ λ
λ λ
⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦Δ = − = .    (13) 
From (13), the expression 0Δ <  is satisfied for 1/ 2γ > , because of the assumption 
[ (2 ), (2 1)]a Min c cγ γ≥ − −  implying 2(1 2 )a c γ λ+ − >0 in Δ  for any 0 1λ≤ ≤ . The value 1/2 
corresponds to an upper bound regarding the cost advantage of the foreign producer and its 
influence on the first-derivative ranking. Thus, for 1/ 2γ > , the first derivative ( ) /idW dλ λ  is 
lower than ( ) /ddW dλ λ  evaluated at any arbitrary level of λ  as represented in Figure 1. Effort 
λ  is located along the horizontal axis of the figure and the first derivatives are on the vertical 
axis.  
Figure 1 represents the first derivatives (12) derived by using the Mathematica software 
for values a=10, c=2, d=3 and 1γ = .1 From Figure 1, it is easy to see that 0Δ < . The first-order 
conditions ( )* / 0i idW dλ λ =  and ( )* / 0d ddW dλ λ =  define the respective welfare maximization 
                                                 
1 All the Mathematica programs generating the five figures are available from the authors upon request. 
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levels of λ and lead to standards such that * *i dλ λ<  (note from (12) that there is no simple 
analytical solution). When the per-unit damage k increases, the two derivatives move upwards 
with ( ) /idW dλ λ  still lower than ( ) /ddW dλ λ , which explains why ( )1 / 0idW dλ >  and 
( )1 / 0ddW dλ >  eventually lead to * * 1i dλ λ= =  when damage is large enough. 
The expression 0Δ =  is satisfied for 1/ 2γ = . In this case, the first derivative 
( ) /idW dλ λ  is equal to ( ) /ddW dλ λ  for any value 0 1λ≤ ≤ , which leads to standards * *i dλ λ= . 
The expression 0Δ >  is satisfied for 1/ 2γ <  and 0 1λ≤ ≤ , corresponding to much more 
competitive foreign producers relative to domestic producers, which means that the first 
derivative ( ) /idW dλ λ  is larger than ( ) /ddW dλ λ  evaluated at any arbitrary level of λ  (namely, 
the opposite case from the one represented in Figure 1). The first-order conditions 
( )* / 0i idW dλ λ =  and ( )* / 0d ddW dλ λ =  defining the respective welfare maximizations lead to 
standards such that * *i dλ λ> . 
Whatever the regulatory choice is, the entry of foreign producers is not restricted by this 
regulatory choice, and the equilibrium price internalizes the marginal cost of the standard. The 
producers simply pass on the marginal cost of the standard to consumers via the price. When the 
per-unit damage increases, the standards *dλ  and *iλ  increase to limit the damage impact. When 
the per-unit damage, d, is relatively large, the optimum choice consists of fully eliminating the 
risk with both domestic and international standards equal to one. When the damage is relatively 
low, situations differ according to Δ  capturing the cost differences between domestic and 
foreign producers. 
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Figure 1 and the previous developments allow us to characterize the difference between 
domestic and international safety standards. Based on the optimization ( )1 / 0ddW dλ =  and 
( )1 / 0idW dλ = , let’s define 
 
2 2
1
2 2
2
2 (4 ) (5 2 2 )
6 3( )
2 ( ) 2 (1 )
2 ( )
a c c c
k
a c c
a c c c
k
a c c
γ γ γ
γ
γ γ γ
γ
⎡ ⎤+ − − +⎣ ⎦= − +
⎡ ⎤+ − − +⎣ ⎦= − +
.      (14) 
If 1k k≥ , then ( )1 / 0ddW dλ > , and if 2k k≥ , then ( )1 / 0idW dλ > . As no simple analytical 
solutions are possible, *dλ  and *iλ  are such that ( )* / 0d ddW dλ λ =  and ( )* / 0i idW dλ λ = . The 
previous developments lead us to the following propositions 1 and 2.  
PROPOSITION 1. If 1/ 2γ < , the regulatory choice is to set the international standard *iλ  
strictly greater than the domestic standard *dλ  if 1k k< , or to set both standards equal to one if 
1k k≥ . The domestic standard *dλ  is non-protectionist (weakly anti-protectionist). 
Proof: direct from equations (12) and (13) and Figure 1. 
Figure 2 illustrates proposition 1 by using the Mathematica software for values a=10, 
c=2, and 1/ 4γ = . The top of Figure 2 represents the optimum standards *dλ  and *iλ  maximizing 
(5) and (6), where the per-unit damage k is located along the horizontal axis and the optimal 
choices *λ  are located on the vertical axis. The corresponding price differences under both 
standards are represented at the bottom of Figure 2, where the per-unit damage k is located along 
the horizontal axis and the price difference ( ) ( )d ip pλ λ−  linked to standards maximizing (5) 
and (6) is on the vertical axis. This price difference under both standards can be interpreted as a 
tariff equivalent, namely, a measure of the (anti)protectionist intensity reflected in prices. The 
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equilibrium price changes, with standards maximizing both domestic and international welfares 
since the cost of regulation is passed on to consumers. A positive value of this price difference is 
a measure of a possible NTB (see Deardorff and Stern, 1998, p. 16). 
In proposition 1, foreign producers are much more efficient than are domestic producers, 
so that the domestic regulator limits the domestic safety standard that is lower than the 
international standard, in order to limit the cost differences c cγ−  that could hurt the domestic 
producers in terms of output and profits (see top of Figure 2). This result is significant, since, 
even if the damage does not affect the demand, a standard imposed by a country can be 
considered as non- or anti-protectionist. This case was overlooked by the previous literature. 
For any values 1/ 2γ < , the tariff equivalent is negative (i.e., an implicit import subsidy) 
for relatively low values of the per-unit damage k since the international standard is larger than 
the domestic standard (see bottom part of Figure 2). The price difference * *( ) ( )d ip pλ λ−  reflects 
the standard differences since all the cost is passed on to the price. For a per-unit 
damage, 20 k k< < , the international standard increase with d is higher than the domestic 
standard increase, which explains the decreasing slope of the price difference * *( ) ( )d ip pλ λ− . For 
2k k> , the international standard reaches a maximum with * 1iλ =  since the damage is relatively 
large, while the domestic standard continues to increase for 1k k< . This explains the increasing 
slope of the price difference *( ) (1)dp pλ −  for 2 1k k k< < . For 1k k> , both domestic and 
international standards reach a maximum with * 1dλ = , and all producers offer products while the 
damage completely disappears. 
 We now turn to the case in which the cost parameter is 1/ 2γ > , summarized in the 
following proposition. 
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PROPOSITION 2. If 1/ 2γ > , the regulatory choices are to set the international standard *iλ  
strictly lower than the domestic standard *dλ  if 2k k< , or to set both standards equal to one if 
2k k≥ . The domestic standard *dλ  is protectionist for 2k k< . 
Proof: direct from equations (12) and (13) and Figure 1. 
Figure 3 illustrates proposition 2 by using the Mathematica software for the values a=10, 
c=2, and 1γ =  (which means that the cost structure is similar for all producers). In proposition 2, 
domestic producers are a little less efficient (for 1/ 2 1γ< < ) or more efficient (for 1γ > ) than 
foreign producers, so that the domestic regulator imposes a higher safety standard compared to 
the international standard to mitigate the expected external damage but without hurting domestic 
producers (see top part of Figure 3). The domestic standard could be interpreted as protectionist 
as it is higher than the international standard. Note that if 2k k< , the difference between both 
standards *dλ  and *iλ  increases when γ  increases, since a larger cost difference leads to a larger 
difference in standards. 
For any value 1/ 2γ > , the tariff equivalent is positive for relatively low-values of the per-
unit damage k since the international standard is lower than the domestic standard (see bottom 
part of Figure 3). The price difference * *( ) ( )d ip pλ λ−  reflects the difference in standards since all 
the cost is passed on in the price. For a per-unit damage, 10 k k< < , the international standard 
increases with k but not as much as the domestic standard does. The latter explains the increasing 
slope of the price difference * *( ) ( )d ip pλ λ− . For 1k k> , the domestic standard reaches a 
maximum with * 1dλ =  since the damage is relatively large, while the international standard 
continues to increase for 1k k> . This explains the decreasing slope of the price difference 
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*(1) ( )ip p λ−  for 1 2k k k< < . For 2k k> , both domestic and international standards reach a 
maximum with * 1iλ = , and all producers offer products while the damage completely disappears. 
From the two previous propositions, we note that protectionism is more likely to emerge 
when damages are low and when domestic producers are better (or at least not much worse) at 
meeting the standard than are foreign producers. Hence, the conditions for protectionism to 
emerge are more contrived than it appears at first glance, raising the issue of potential 
overstatement of protectionism in policy debates and the literature. 
 
5. The optimum standard under possible exclusion 
We now turn to configurations where some producers may exit the market following the 
imposition of a standard. Exclusion (or exit) is widespread for developing countries that 
sometimes lack private and/or public capital for satisfying some safety requirements. For 
instance, the European Commission has recently adopted a blacklist of airlines, which are 
banned in the European Union for lack of safety (EC, 2006). It means that the safety standards 
are lower for some foreign countries compared to those of the European Union. 
Under the assumptions of section 2, exclusion is possible for relatively large values of 
0 1λ≤ ≤  if [ (2 ), (2 1)]a Max c cγ γ< − −  corresponding to ? ?, 1d fMin λ λ⎡ ⎤ <⎣ ⎦  (see equation (3)). 
Under exclusion, various regulatory choices maximize welfares defined by (8), (9), or (11). We 
respectively distinguish the case for which the exclusion of the domestic producer is possible 
from the one for which the exclusion of the domestic producer is not possible. 
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5.1. Possible exclusion of domestic producers  
 If the standard is such that ? dλ λ≥  with ? 1dλ <  corresponding to (2 )a c γ< − , domestic 
producers exit the market. Only foreign producers offer products (see equations (7), (8), and (9) 
in section 3). Figure 4 represents the standard choice (top part) and the corresponding tariff 
equivalent (bottom part) generated with the Mathematica software for values a=10, c=10, and 
2 /5γ = . This last value means that foreign producers are more efficient than the domestic 
producers regarding the ability to comply with any standard. There is no simple analytical 
solution for the different frontiers 3k  to 6k  on the horizontal axis. 
If 3k k< , the per-unit damage is relatively low, which explains relatively low standards 
maximizing (5) or (6). All producers produce since both optimum standards *dλ  and *iλ , the 
solutions of ( )* / 0d ddW dλ λ =  and ( )* / 0i idW dλ λ = , are lower than the threshold ? dλ  above 
which domestic producers exit the market. The international standard *iλ  is higher than the 
domestic standard *dλ  for the same reasons as in proposition 1 since 2 /5 1/ 2γ = < . The tariff 
equivalent is negative, since the international standard is larger than the domestic standard (see 
bottom part of Figure 4). This is an anti-protectionist situation. 
If 3k k≥ , a domestic standard equal to one leads to the exclusion of domestic producers. 
In this case the domestic welfare ( )*d dW λ , given by (5) with an effort *dλ  and with all producers, 
is strictly lower than the domestic welfare (1)dW , given by (8) with an effort equal to one but 
without domestic producers.2 In other words, the benefit of eliminating the expected external 
                                                 
2 The value 3k  is determined by ( )*d dW λ = (1)dW . For 3k k< , the inequality ( )*d dW λ > ( )dW λ  is satisfied for any 
0 1λ≤ ≤ . For 3k k> , the inequality (1) / 0ddW dλ >  is satisfied, which leads to a regulatory choice equal to one.  
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damage with (1) 0K =  (see section 3) outweighs the economic loss linked to the exclusion of 
domestic producers. 
If 3 6k k k≤ < , the domestic standard equal to one becomes protectionist since it is higher 
than the international optimum standard. The latter takes on values equal to *iλ  if 3 4k k k≤ < , to 
?
dλ  if 4 5k k k≤ < , and to *iλ  if 5 6k k k≤ < .3 In this case, “protectionism” emerges even if 
domestic producers exit the market, and the domestic purpose is obviously not to protect 
domestic producers but rather to eliminate the expected external damage (1) 0K = . Even if the 
cost of meeting the standard 2cγ λ  is passed on to consumers, foreign producers bear a 
significant part of this cost. This explains why the international standard maximizing (6) or (9) 
including the foreign producers’ profits is lower than a domestic standard maximizing (8) 
without domestic producers. If 3 4k k k≤ < , the domestic standard equal to one leads to the 
exclusion of the domestic industry, while the international standard equal to ?* diλ λ<  allows the 
presence of domestic producers. This is a counterintuitive result since a domestic country 
imposes the exit of domestic producers compared to an international standard allowing domestic 
producers. If 4k k≥ , both standards lead to the exclusion of domestic producers. For 6k k≥ , both 
domestic and international standards reach a maximum equal to one with only foreign producers 
offering products. 
                                                 
3 If 3 4k k k≤ < , the international welfare ( )*i iW λ  given by (6) with an effort *iλ  and with all producers is strictly 
higher than international welfares ?( )i dW λ  or *( )i iW λ  with *iλ  such that *( ) / 0i idW dλ λ = and iW  given by (9) 
without domestic producers. If 4k k≥ , *( )i iW λ > ( )*i iW λ , but ?*i dλ λ< . As ( )2 2/ 0id W dλ λ >  for any level of 
0 λ≤ ≤ ? dλ , the level ? dλ  defined by (3) is selected and it leads to the exclusion of domestic producers. For 5k k≥ , 
the inequality ?*i dλ λ≥  is satisfied leading to an international standard equal to *iλ . 
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Regarding the corresponding tariff equivalent (see bottom of Figure 4), there is a 
discontinuity since the equivalent is negative (i.e., an implicit import subsidy) if 3k k< , and 
positive (i.e., an implicit import tax) if 3 6k k k≤ <  because of the exclusion of domestic 
producers (with ( )p λ  defined by (7)). Clearly, this effect should be taken into account in all 
empirical measures of nontariff barriers, since having more efficient foreign producers compared 
to domestic ones does not necessary imply the absence of protectionism. A domestic regulator 
may be tempted to impose a higher standard compared to the international standard when 
domestic producers exit the market. 
5.2. Possible exclusion of foreign producers 
If the standard is such that ? fλ λ≥  with ? 1fλ <  corresponding to (2 1)a c γ< − , foreign 
producers exit the market. Only domestic producers offer products (see equations (10) and (11) 
in section 3). Figure 5 represents the optimal standard (at the top) and the tariff equivalent (at the 
bottom), also generated by the Mathematica software for values a=10, c=4, and 15/ 2γ = .  
If 6k k< , there is no exclusion of foreign producers. The per-unit damage k is relatively 
low, which explains relatively low standards maximizing (5) or (6). The domestic standard *dλ  is 
higher than the international standard *iλ  (the interpretation is similar to the one of proposition 
2).  
If 6k k≥ , the domestic standard is equal to ? ?*[ , ]f dMax λ λ  with ?*dλ  such that 
? ?*( ) / 0d ddW dλ λ = . The standard then leads to the exclusion of foreign producers, while the 
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international standard *iλ  allows all producers to offer products if 6 8k k k≤ ≤ .4 For this latter 
case, the lower price effect coming from the presence of all producers outweighs the effect of a 
lower standard *iλ  compared to the domestic standard favoring a higher equilibrium price. This 
occurs because of the exclusion of foreign producers and the high standard ? ?*[ , ]f dMax λ λ . 
Exclusion leads to discontinuities in tariff equivalent (see bottom of Figure 5). If 8k k≥ , both 
domestic and foreign standards are the same and this leads to the exclusion of foreign producers. 
Section 5 underscores the impact of producers’ exclusion. In particular, exclusion leads to 
discontinuities in tariff equivalent and even a shift in the sign of this tariff equivalent when less-
efficient domestic producers leave the market (see Figure 4). Note that exclusion emerges even if 
there is no assumption of fixed cost incurred by sellers. In our model, the crucial point is the cost 
heterogeneity between domestic and foreign producers leading to the possible exclusion of 
inefficient producers. 
 
6. Extensions 
In order to identify and focus on the main economic mechanisms at work, we kept the 
mathematical aspects as sparse as possible. Our analysis could accommodate various contexts 
using the following extensions of our model.  
1. We did not consider any demand for the foreign country, which is an extreme 
assumption but corresponds to situations where there is no effective local demand. This 
                                                 
4 The value 6k  is determined by ( )2 2/ 0dd W dλ λ =  with ( )dW λ given by (5). For 6 7k k k≤ < , ? fλ  leads to the 
highest welfare. The value 7k  is determined by ? ?
*
f dλ λ= , with ? ?( )* / 0d ddW dλ λ =  and ? ( )dW λ  given by (11). The 
value 8k  is determined by ? ?( )*d dW λ = ( )*i iW λ  with iW  given by (6) with an effort *iλ . 
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configuration could be introduced. In this new context, results would be close to results 
presented in this paper, even if some values of standards or frontiers in figures would change. 
2. Throughout the model, we assumed that the external damage is separable from market 
consumption. However, demand and the external damage can interact when consumers are aware 
of the damage, for example, via better information provision (Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983) or 
by abating health effects of pollution with market decisions (Espinosa and Smith, 1995). Again, 
results would be close to results presented in this paper but with multiple cases, and some values 
of standards and frontiers in figures would obviously change. This extension leads to multiplicity 
of cases but with the similar dichotomy of key results of anti-protectionism/protectionism linked 
to the domestic standard relative to the international one. 
3. We abstracted from market power that would arise under a reduced number of firms able 
to enter the market. This is particularly the case when endogenous sunk costs are linked to firms’ 
effort to reduce expected external damages. Using the notation of section 2, such a sunk cost 
could be equal to 2cλ  and 2cγ λ  but would not depend on output levels selected by producers (a 
fixed-cost shift rather than a marginal-cost shift). The consequences of a sunk cost for improving 
safety would be a limited number of firms able to produce and the absence of this cost passed on 
to consumers in the price. The results under producers’ exclusion in section 5 are very close to 
the results with firms’ exit under endogenous sunk cost for improving safety. 
4. We assumed a regulatory/inspection cost equal to zero, even if imposing a standard is 
obviously costly to monitor. Without inspection, the regulator will rarely have as accurate 
information as the firm with respect to the effort for getting safety. Depending on the cost of 
firms’ inspection, the regulator has to determine the number of inspections for domestic and 
foreign firms, the penalty for absence of compliance, and the way to finance such a policy. 
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Clearly, the social benefits of imposing a standard in the paper would be diminished by taking 
into account the cost of regulation and would lead to lower standards. 
5. The cost heterogeneity defined by γ  was linked to the effort/standard choice. An 
alternative assumption could also consider additional cost heterogeneity among countries linked 
to other factors, such as the labor cost. Such a type of heterogeneity could reinforce the exclusion 
of producers with a high labor cost, for instance, with similar mechanisms to the ones presented 
in section 5. 
6. Throughout the model, we assumed that the regulator was acting in the public’s best 
interest. One stumbling block for such regulatory optimality is the efficiency of the public 
regulatory authority itself. Public agencies may be “doomed” if  either (i) their mandate is not 
clearly defined, (ii) they suffer from excessive bureaucracy, or (iii) the industrial lobby’s 
influence creates lax regulation. A regulator may sometimes choose more than the necessary 
amount of regulation with a very large standard, depending on the incumbent’s influences upon 
the agency. Kim (1997) underscores how regulation is suboptimal when an incumbent behaves 
strategically against the government (the regulator, as a follower, deters entry by newcomers, 
protecting the incumbent’s oligopoly situation), an aspect we did not consider here. This raises 
the question of lobbying by the domestic firm, as in Fisher and Serra (2000). 
7. Government regulation is not the only approach deserving consideration, with measures 
ranging from voluntary practice, codes of good conduct, “private” standard, and market 
incentives as reputation mechanisms or quality/safety signaling. One extension that is of interest 
concerns that of a voluntary standard/certification system in which each firm decides whether or 
not to comply with the standard. This question is particularly important in an international 
context, where supermarkets impose higher safety standards for food to developing countries 
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compared to the ones defined by countries or international organizations like the Codex 
Alimentarius (Henson and Reardon, 2005). 
 
7. Conclusions 
Using a sparse framework, various mechanisms were elucidated by which domestic and 
international contexts may influence the provision of a product’s environment/safety via a 
standard. This stylized framework made it possible to infer some essential economic mechanisms 
that are valid in various realistic situations.  
By focusing on safety and trade, the paper led to new results. We showed that a standard 
can be anti-protectionist, which is the case when foreign producers are much more efficient than 
domestic producers. Clearly, the difference between both standards depends on the relative 
efficiency of domestic and foreign producers. We also showed that protectionism could emerge 
without a protectionist motive when domestic producers are excluded from the market because 
they are unable to meet the standard although foreign producers can meet the standard. 
We also showed that a tariff equivalent related to the impact of standard choices in 
equilibrium price may be positive or negative, since domestic and foreign choices differ. 
Heterogeneity matters a lot in the characterization of the sign of tariff equivalents. Eventually, 
when exclusion may occur for relatively high values of standards, a tariff equivalent may change 
signs when exclusion occurs (see section 5).  
These results have consequences for empirical evaluations of NTB in sensitive sectors 
such as food industries or services. The general approach of comparing the domestic price and 
the world price without a reference to an international standard is likely to be flawed. Moreover, 
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any such measure of a tariff equivalent that further abstracts from producers’ heterogeneity in 
meeting the standard is likely to be flawed. 
This model suggests that it is especially imperative for governments to examine not only 
the safety regulations imposed upon an industry but also market and competitive structure 
(including the firms’ profitability influencing the exit/entry). These results mean that a regulator 
or the WTO should also focus on competitive structures and market mechanisms, and not only 
on risk assessment, when a domestic standard differs from the international standard. 
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